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INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INDIAN
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Indians' living on reservations2 within our country no longer enjoy
the independence and right of self-government that once characterized
their relationship with the federal government.3 The courts4 and Con-
gress, since the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),5 have
imposed on tribal governments the same or similar constitutional stan-
I. The term "Indian" includes:
[A]II persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now
under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who
were, on I June 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation,
and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood ....
25 U.S.C. § 479 (1976).
2. An "Indian reservation" consists of lands validly set apart for the use of Indians under
the supervision of the government. The United States retains title to the land. Healing v. Jones,
210 F. Supp. 125 (D. Ariz. 1962), ajfd, 373 U.S. 758 (1963) (per curiam). Hunting & Fishing,
Wind River Reservation, 58 INTERIOR DEC. 331, 343 (1943) ("An Indian reservation is simply a
part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for use and occupation by a group of
Indians .... The United States holds the title .... ") (citation omitted).
3. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
1832). See general, Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 INTERIOR DEC. 14 (1934); U.S. DEe'T OF THE
INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958).
Throughout the 1800's, the federal government and Indian tribes entered into various treaties
that formally provided for tribal sovereignty. Article Five of the Treaty with the Cherokees,
signed in 1835 provides:
The United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee
Nation in the foregoing article shall, in no future time without their consent, be included
within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory. But they shall secure
to the Cherokee nation the right by their national councils to make and carry into effect
all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government and protection of the
persons and property within their own country belonging to their people or such persons
as have connected themselves with them: provided always that they shall not be incon-
sistent with the constitution of the United States and such acts of Congress as have been
or may be passed regulating trade and intercourse with the Indians ....
Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, United States-Cherokee Nation, art. V, 7 Stat. 478, 481.
4. See. e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One
Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973); Collifiower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
5. In 1968 Congress enacted the Indian Bill of Rights as part of the Civil Rights Act. Act of
April I1, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303 (1976)):
§ 1302 Constitutional Rights.
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable
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dards6 that restrict state and local governments, despite the incompati-
bility of those standards with Indian lifestyle and tribal constitutions.
7
This Note first develops the historic basis of the Indian sovereignty
doctrine and its later modifications. Second, the Note discusses the
ICRA as the method used by Congress to impose the Bill of Rights of
the United States Constitution on tribal governments. Last, the Note
examines conflicting interpretations of the ICRA. Indians have chal-
lenged the Act as a method by which the federal government used its
own constitutional standards to restrict tribal activities." Recently,
however, courts have begun to interpret the statute on the basis of tribal
customs and traditions.' Thus, this Note concludes that although the
ICRA represents a significant intrusion on Indian sovereignty,' 0 judi-
cial standards of review based on tribal customs can minimize its dele-
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments,
and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment
greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive
any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right,
upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
§ 1303. Habeas Corpus.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of
the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.
6. "Constitutional standards" refers to the generally recognized elements used by the court
in applying the Constitution to the factual situation of the case at bar. For example, under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the constitutional standard developed by
the Court is that all persons are guaranteed equal treatment under the law unless there is a reason-
able basis (traditional equal protection) or a compelling state interest (strict scrutiny) to justify
disparate treatment. See NOWAK, HORNBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 522-25 (1978).
7. The Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976), establishes mechanisms
and procedures by which Indian tribes can organize and govern their internal affairs on the basis
of their own constitutions. Id. § 476.
8. See notes 113-18 infra and accompanying text. The restrictions imposed by the ICRA
are primarily geared toward limiting the scope of tribal governmental power over tribal members.
See text of ICRA, supra note 5.
9. See generally notes 119-54 infra and accompanying text.
10. See note 114 infra and accompanying text.
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terious effects. I
I. INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
The ultimate source of Indian sovereignty is the "tribe's primeval
nationhood."' 2 The Supreme Court, in Worcester v. Georgia,'3 recog-
nized this sovereignty by holding that Indian tribes have a right of self-
government and are not subject to the jurisdiction of the states within
which they are located. 4 The basic premise of the Worcester decision
was that each Indian tribe began its relationship with the federal gov-
ernment as a sovereign power whose acceptance of the stronger sover-
eign's protection did not constitute a surrender of the tribe's
independence and right of self-government. t5 Chief Justice Marshall
described the Indian nations as "distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, [within which their authority is exclusive, and
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries,] which is not
only acknowledged, but guarantied[sic] by the United States."' 6
11. See notes 138-53 infra and accompanying text.
12. The phrase refers to the tribes' original status as autonomous governmental bodies prior
to the arrival of the white man on the American continent. See Navajo Tribe v. Orlando Helicop-
ter Airways, 6 AM. INDIAN L. NEWSLETTER 90, 92 (Navajo Ct. App. 1972); Powers of Indian
Tribes, 55 INTERIOR DEC. 14, 22 (1934).
13. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
14. Id. at 561. More recent state enabling acts and constitutions incorporated disclaimers of
state jurisdiction. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 3, at 503 n.17 (1958). The Worcester
concept of tribal autonomy within its territory has been modified. States now have jurisdiction
over non-Indian affairs within the reservation. See New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496
(1946); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). See also Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264
(1898). Regulations governing Indian land and reservations appear at 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1976)
(authorizing state inspection and investigation of sanitary and health facilities on Indian reserva-
tions). Some states have substantial jurisdiction over the tribes within their borders on the basis of
congressional acts: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976).
15. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555, 560-61; Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 INTERIOR DEC. 14, 22 (1934).
The United States government recognized this original sovereignty in early dealings with the In-
dian tribes. Treaties with the Indians were "couched in the language of international diplomacy."
Clinton, Derelopment of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands.- The Historical Perspective, 17
ARIz. L. REv. 951, 953 (1975).
16. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557. "The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community, occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cher-
okees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress." Id. at 561. See
also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Ex Pare Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
Congress's power to declare war, to make treaties, and to regulate commerce served as an addi-
tional basis for preemption of state jurisdiction over Indian tribes. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557, 559.
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The tribal entity deteriorated, and by 1871 Congress no longer recog-
nized Indian tribes as "independent nations." Congress enacted legis-
lation stating that "hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as
an independent iiation, tribe, or power with whom the United States
may contract by treaty." 17 The Supreme Court followed this legislative
mandate by ruling that Indian tribes were no longer sovereign na-
tions.18 Congress passed the General Allotment Act 9 in 1887, author-
izing the division of reservation land among individual Indians.20 The
apparent purpose was to assimilate the Indian into contemporary soci-
ety by eliminating the tribal structure.2' The government's assimilation
policy, however, had detrimental social and economic effects.22 Con-
gress responded, somewhat belatedly,23 by enacting the Indian Reor-
ganization Act (IRA) of 1934.24 The IRA established mechanisms and
procedures by which Indian tribes could organize and govern their in-
ternal affairs.25 The Act provided for the tribes' adopting constitutions
that were effective when approved by the tribe and by the Secretary of
17. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566. The Act provided, however, that all previ-
ously enacted treaties would still be valid. Id.
18. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court rejected the argument that
Indians were "nations" under the Constitution. "If so, the natural phrase would have been 'for-
eign nations and Indian nations,' or, in the terseness of language uniformly used by the framers of
the instrument, it would naturally have been 'foreign and Indian nations.'" Id. at 379. Accord,
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901) (the term "nation" as applied to Indian tribes
is a misnomer); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 484-86 (1899) (because the federal
government controls the Indian tribes, they cannot be considered sovereign independent states);
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27 (1886) (Indian tribe is not an independent state or
a sovereign nation).
19. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
20. Id.
21. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 207-10 (1942).
22. Commenting on anticipated adverse effects, a minority report dealing with legislation
similar to the General Allotment Act observed:
The real aim of this bill is to get at the Indian lands and open them up to settle-
ment. . . .If this were done in the name of Greed, it would be bad enough; but to do it
in the name of Humanity, and under the cloak of an ardent desire to promote the In-
dian's welfare by making him like ourselves, whether he will or not, is infinitely worse.
H.R. REP. No. 1576, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1880). See 5 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
JUSTICE: 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 123 (1961). "What had been intended as a
'civilizing' agent, produced a generation of landless, impoverished Indians, shorn by the social
cohesiveness of tribal culture." Id.
23. Forty-seven years passed between the enactment of the General Allotment Act and the
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act.
24. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976)).
25. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/16
Number 3] INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 901
the Interior.26 Arguably, the IRA merely provided a framework within
which tribes could exercise preexisting powers.27 Thus, with the adop-
tion of the IRA, federal policy had come full circle: from Worcester's
recognition of tribal sovereignty to the General Allotment Act's policy
of assimilation by destroying tribal structure, back to recognition-now
by the IRA-of tribal autonomy. The IRA recognized tribal sover-
eignty as absolute, subject only to limitations by treaty or express con-
gressional legislation.28
Courts were thus compelled to define the boundaries of the sover-
eignty doctrine. Courts have indicated that the doctrine provides tribes
with power to define duties of tribal officials,2 9 to repeal a provision in
a treaty with the federal government by tribal legislative action,30 and
to determine tribal membership. 3' Although the courts have granted
these extensive "internal powers," 32 they have refused to grant Indians
26. Id. § 476.
27. See Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 94, 98-99 (8th Cir. 1956); F. COHEN,
supra note 21, at 122.
28. The court in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959), stated, "[A]bsent governing Acts
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reser-
vation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Accord, Organized Village of Kake
v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74-76 (1962); Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970). See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (Navajo
Tribe retained power to punish tribal offenders); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89
(8th Cir. 1956) (Sioux Tribe retained power to levy taxes); Barnes v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 97
(D. Mont. 1962) (Crow Tribe not subject to suit without consent of Congress).
29. See Pueblo of Santa Rose v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315 (1927).
30. See Chickasaw Freedmen, 193 U.S. 115 (1904).
31. See Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127 (1904); Smith v. Bonnifer, 154 F.
8S3 (D. Or. 1907), aft'd, 166 F. 846 (9th Cir. 1909). But see Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249
F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir. 1957) (power is qualified "where the question involved is the distribution
of tribal funds and other property under the supervision and control of the federal government"),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960, rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 924 (1958); 25 U.S.C. § 163. See generally
Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971); Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F.
Supp. 1157 (D. Wyo. 1970) (mem.), aft'dsub nom. Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d
278 (10th Cir. 1971); Godfroy v. United States, 458 F.2d 93 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
32. Other internal powers include tribal power to govern domestic relations, United States v.
Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916); voting age of tribal members in tribal elections, Wounded Head v.
Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975); taxation of tribal members,
Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); exclusion of trespassers from tribal
reservations, Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975); and administration of
criminal justice, Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). See generally Powers of Indian Tribes,
55 INTERIOR DEC. 14 (1934).
The powers of a local self-government should arguably be unlimited within its sphere of influ-
ence except to the extent checked by applicable federal statutory or regulatory provisions. No
federal constitutional provisions control the powers of self-government because, except for the
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"external powers" to govern affairs having effect outside the tribal terri-
tory.33
Although the internal-external powers distinction seemingly presents
a clear-cut analysis of the Indian sovereignty doctrine, it does not re-
solve the sovereignty dilemma. The power of the federal government
over Indian affairs is pervasive, regardless of the internal or external
nature of the Indian-controlled activity.34  The major source of this
power is Article One, Section Eight, of the United States Constitu-
tion,35 which grants Congress plenary power to regulate commerce with
the Indian tribes. 6 Courts have defined this power as "full, entire,
commerce clause, the Constitution does not address the objectives for which tribal powers can be
exercised. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I (giving Congress power to regulate commerce with Indians).
Federal regulatory provisions authorized by statutes can impose standards or affect the reach of
tribal sovereign powers by virtue of Congress' plenary power over Indian affairs. See generally
Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); Barnes v. United States, 205 F.
Supp. 97 (D. Mont. 1962).
33. Felix Cohen described the reason for Indians' lack of external powers: "Conquest ren-
ders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the
external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign na-
tions, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe . F. COHEN, supra
note 21, at 123.
34. See Exparte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1911); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Arm-
strong v. United States, 306 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v. Taylor, 33 F.2d 608 (D.
Wash. 1929), rev'don other grounds, 283 U.S. 820 (1930); United States v. Cattaraugus Country,
67 F. Supp. 294 (W.D.N.Y. 1946); Mashunkaskey, 191 Okla. 501, 134 P.2d 976 (1943); Chippewa
Indians v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 1, atd, 307 U.S. 1 (1938). The relationship between the
United States and Indians is similar to that between guardian and ward. In United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886), the Court stated:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government because it has
never existed anywhere else; because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical
limits of the United States; because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its law on all the tribes.
See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903);
Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1977); Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835 (8th Cir. 1908);
United States ex rel Ildefonso v. Brewer, 184 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.M. 1960). It is arguable that
because the government has charged itself with the obligation of protecting the Indians, which
involves a high degree of responsibility and trust, its conduct should "be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards." Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1941).
35. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: [The Congress shall have Power] "To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes".
36. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1972) (power to determine
whether state may tax Indian tribe); Exparte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1912) (power to control traffic
of intoxicating liquors); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (power to tax Indian-owned
livestock); United States v. Taylor, 33 F.2d 608 (W.D. Wash. 1929) (power is not limited by state
police power), rev'don other grounds, 44 F.2d 531, cert. denied, 283 U.S. 820 (1930); United States
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complete . . . and unqualified."37 Delegated officials, such as the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior, have
the duty to exercise this power.3 8 At times, this plenary power has al-
lowed for almost total control over numerous aspects of Indian life.39
For example, many Indian decisions, both tribal and individual, must
be approved by the federal government before they become effective.4"
v. Vulles, 282 F. Supp. 829 (D. Mont. 1968) (power to deal with Indian land for benefit of Indi-
ans); City of Tulsa v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 5 F. Supp. 822 (D. Okla. 1934) (power to grant
rights of way through Indian territory), afd, 75 F.2d 343 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 744
(1935); Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (power to grant state courts jurisdiction over
certain Indian affairs), rev'don other grounds, 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
37. Mashunkaskey v. Mashunkaskey, 191 Okla. 501, 134 P.2d 976 (1942). See Chippewa
Indians v. United States, 88 Ct. Cl. 1, afd, 307 U.S. 1 (1938). Some federal courts, however, have
refused to accept the full implications of the congressional plenary power and have "continued to
operate under the theory that tribal sovereignty and federal plenary powers are not inconsistent."
M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 21 (1973).
38. 25 U.S.C. § l(a) (1976).
39. See Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373 (1921) (acquisition of tribal lands); United States ex
rel West v. Hitchcock, 205 U.S. 80 (1906) (adoption of Whites into Indian tribes); Oliver v. Udall,
306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (regulation of use of peyote); Armstrong v. United States, 306 F.2d
520 (10th Cir. 1962) (management of health and water projects on Indian reservation); Frazier v.
Goddard, 63 F. Supp. 696 (D. Okla. 1945) (power over procedure for partition of Indian land);
People ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 294 N.Y. 61, 60 N.E.2d 541 (commission of crimes on Indian reser-
vations), a ftd, 326 U.S. 496 (1945).
40. The following are a few statutory examples in which the government's consent is re-
quired: approval of contracts with Indian tribes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 881 (1976); approval of tribal
membership rolls for trust asset distribution, id. § 163 (1976); approval of wills disposing of trust
or restricted property, id. § 373 (1976); approval of tribal constitutions and bylaws, id. § 476
(1976). The requirement of governmental approval stems from the notion that Indians occupy a
wardship position under the guardianship of the United States. This guardian-ward relationship
was first described in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); the court stated:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent upon
the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States and receive from them no protection. From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Fed-
eral government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises
the duty of protection, and with it the power.
Id. at 383-84 (emphasis in original).
The court later pointed out that Congress has the power to determine when the wardship ceases
to exist. See Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911):
[Ilt may be taken as the settled doctrine of this court that Congress, in pursuance of the
long established policy of the government, has a right to determine for itself when the
guardianship which has been maintained over the Indian shall cease. It is for that body,
and not the courts, to determine when the true interests of the Indian require his release
from such a condition of tutelage.
Although some commentators suggest that the government rarely assumes its role as guardian,
Oliver, The Legal Status of.4merican Lidian Tribes, 340 OR. L. REV. 193, 241 (1959), appropria-
tions statutes indicate otherwise. See, e.g., 87 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1976); 87 Stat. 429, 430-33 (1973);
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The semi-independent status of tribal governments dictates an inter-
play of federal and tribal jurisdiction within one territory. Tribal juris-
diction exists when federal law has conferred upon the tribe the power
of self-government over the subject of the litigation or when there is a
risk of conflicting adjudications.4 The tribe has exclusive jurisdiction
when a tribal member violates a tribal law within the territorial limits
of the reservation.42 If an individual alleges that federally secured
rights have been violated by the tribal government, he must exhaust
tribal remedies before enlisting federal court jurisdiction.43 Unless spe-
cifically authorized by Congress, tribal courts do not have jurisdiction
to try or to punish non-Indian offenders.'
Jurisdiction of federal courts to review exercises of tribal powers or
tribal constitutional interpretations exists when the tribe is subject to
federal statutory authority.45 The jurisdiction of federal district courts
over crimes committed by Indians on reservations is limited to murder,
manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a
dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, larceny, and embezzle-
ment or theft of tribal funds.46
86 Stat. 508, 509-12 (1972); 85 Stat. 45 (1971); 84 Stat. 669, 670-72 (1970); 82 Stat. 1190, 1195
(1968); 80 Stat. 1057, 1959-60 (1966).
41. See Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (adoption proceeding in state court may
cause risk of conflicting adjudications affecting custody of child).
42. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
43. See Olney Runs After v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 437 F. Supp. 1035 (D.S.D. 1977).
44. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
45. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Indians' recovery
of fair rental value of lands); United States exrel. Chase v. Wald, 557 F.2d 157 (8th Cir.) (Indians'
recovery of federal statutory penalty from non-Indian defendant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002
(1977); Johnson v. Lower Elwah Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973) (jurisdiction
under Indian Civil Rights Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1976)); Fort Mojare Tribe v. Lafollette,
478 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973) (protection of Indians' property rights when United States declines
to act).
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1163 (1976) (Assimilative Crimes Act). In Williams v. United States,
327 U.S. 711 (1946), the Assimilative Crimes Act was held inapplicable to Indian reservations.
The statute incorporated the criminal laws of the states into the laws of the United States, so that
certain violations may be prosecuted as federal offenses. Compare Williams with 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1976), which provides that the Assimilative Crimes Act "shall not extend to offenses committed
by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian or to cases where exclusive juris-
diction is secured to the tribe." See United States v. Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1950). When
federal courts assume jurisdiction over Indian affairs, they rely on familiar federal constitutional
standards if the language of tribal constitutions is similar to that of the Federal Constitution. See,
e.g., White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973) (Indian Civil Rights Act embraces
one-person-one-vote principle); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973) (equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of Indian Civil Rights Act prohibit tribal governments from ignor-
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Thus, the term "sovereign" does not accurately describe the current
status of tribal governments. In reality, Indians have retained few ves-
tiges of the pure sovereignty originally envisaged by the Court,4 7 as
evidenced by Congress' plenary power over Indian affairs4 8 and Indian
courts' restricted jurisdiction within Indian territory.4 9 Stronger evi-
dence of the subordinate status of Indian tribes is the judicial and legis-
lative imposition of the federal constitutional amendments on tribal
governments.50
II. PRE-INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT APPLICATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS TO TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS
Federal Constitutional provisions are inapplicable to Indian tribal
actions5' unless expressly made applicable by Congress.5" Federal
courts have repeatedly upheld this rule by refusing to extend constitu-
tional restrictions to tribal activities. 53  Before the enactment of the
ICRA in 1968, Indian affairs were largely governed by statutory, not
Ing their own election rules). But see Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp.
360 (D. Mont. 1977) (tribal chairman's due process claims concerning his impeachment by Crow
trbal council were not to be gauged against United States Constitution and procedure set forth
therein for impeachment, but should be measured against tribal custom and structure of govern-
ment).
Unlike federal courts, state courts have no power to regulate Indian governance of reservations
except where Congress has specifically granted that power. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v.
Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1976).
47. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
49. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
50. See general), notes 51-118 infra and accompanying text.
51. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (fifth amendment); Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d
819 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (first amendment); Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
131 (10th Cir. 1959) (first amendment); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958)
(fourteenth amendment), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249
F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957) (fifth amendment), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960, rehearing denied, 357 U.S.
924 (1957); United States v. Seneca Nation, 274 F. 946 (W.D.N.Y. 1921). See generally Note, The
Constitutional Rights of the American Tribal Indians, 51 VA. L. REv. 121 (1965) (discussion of
federal courts' refusals to extend constitutional restrictions over Indian tribal activities because of
respect for Indian sovereignty). The author argues in favor of imposing general provisions of the
Constitution on tribal governments because, after the Supreme Court's ruling in Talton, all Indi-
ans have become citizens. Id. at 135. Imposition of the federal Constitution may also be justified
as necessary to provide Indians' judicial structure with some firm basis. Id.
52. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Smith, The
Constitutional Status fAmerican Indians, 6 C.R. DIG. 12, 14 (1973).
53. See Note, supra note 51.
Washington University Open Scholarship
906 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
constitutional, restrictions. 4
In 1896 the Supreme Court considered for the first time whether the
amendments to the United States Constitution should be imposed on
tribal governments. In Talton v. Mayes15 the Supreme Court held that
the fifth amendment did not invalidate Cherokee legislation that pre-
scribed criminal grand juries. 6 The Court reasoned that the Cherokee
nation was an autonomous governmental unit with the right to punish
offenses.57  Federal treaties and statutes recognized this right, and,
therefore, the tribe's punishment of offenders was an authorized act of
a sovereign tribal unit and an exercise of powers derived from the fed-
eral government.58 Because the fifth amendment is applicable only to
federal governmental actions, it does not provide a basis for invalidat-
ing the grand jury procedure used by the Cherokee tribe.5 9 The Court's
conclusion was a logical extension of tribal sovereignty.
Since Talton, federal courts have used similar reasoning to decide
that the Bill of Rights is not applicable to tribal governments. 60 In Na-
tive American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council" the Tenth Circuit held
that the first amendment did not apply to the Navajo government.62
The court reasoned that the Constitution is "binding upon Indian na-
tions only where it expressly binds them, or is made binding by treaty
or some act of Congress." 63 No such act of Congress or constitutional
provision applies the first amendment to Indian governments. 64
54. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (attack based on fifth amendment).
55. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
56. Id. at 382.
57. Id. at 383-84.
58. Id. at 384.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, 356 U.S.
960, rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 924 (1957), which relied on Talton to hold that a tribe may deter-
mine its membership without fifth amendment restrictions. Many courts adhered to the rule that
the Constitution is binding on Indian tribes only where it expressly binds them or is made binding
by treaty or by an act of Congress. Therefore, federal courts have no claim for violations by tribal
governments of the first and fifth amendments. See Oliver v. Udall, 306 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.
1962); Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959); Barta v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Iron Crow v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429
(D.N.M. 1954).
61. 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 134.
64. Id. at 134-35. See generally Note, Indian Tribes and Cipil Rights, 7 STAN. L. REv. 285
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In Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe65 the Eighth Circuit held that the
fourteenth amendment does not place limitations on Indian tribes be-
cause it is only applicable to state, and not tribal, action.66 The court
followed Talton in refusing to invoke the fifth amendment to invalidate
a tribal legislative act.67 Similarly, the Montana District Court, in
Gloi'er v. United States,6 8 held that the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel does not apply to prosecutions in Indian tribal courts because this
right is protected only in actions brought by the United States.69
Whether tribal Indians are entitled to protection from illegal search
and seizure7' or from interference with freedom of speech, press, or
assembly7 is questionable. Finally, the tribal government may impose
a tax" or revoke tribal membership rights7 3 without facing due process
restrictions.
In Collflower v. Garland74 the Ninth Circuit questioned the inappli-
cability of federal constitutional provisions to tribal governments.75
The court ruled, in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by an Indian,
that Indian courts "function in part as a federal agency and in part as a
tribal agency, and that consequently, it is competent for a federal court
(1955); see also Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954) (claim of tribal
infringement of religious freedom based upon Civil Rights Act failed).
65. 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959).
66. Id. at 556. See Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Mont. 1963); f Toledo
v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954) (tribe not state or territory under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1964)).
67. 259 F.2d at 556-57.
68. 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont. 1963).
69. Id. at 21. The denial of legal counsel has also been justified on the ground that, as tribal
judges are usually legally unsophisticated, lawyers would only confuse them with technical subtle-
ties. In addition, as a practical matter, the services of trained counsel would be of questionable
value because tribal court actions are governed by Indian laws and customs that vary from tribe to
tribe. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights ofthe American Indian Before the Subcomm. on Consti-
tutional Rights ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 24 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
70. See Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) (by
implication).
71. See COMMISSION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN, THE INDIAN (1966).
72. See Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958) (tax on use of Indian trust
lands by nonmembers of tribe), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,
231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956) (tax for privilege of grazing stock on reservation land).
73. See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960,
rehearing denied, 357 U.S. 924 (1957).
74. 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
75. Id.
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in a habeas corpus proceeding to inquire into the legality of the deten-
tion of an Indian pursuant to an order of an Indian court."76 The rea-
soning is typical of that used by courts and Congress in the mid-1960's,
when they attempted to assure Indian civil rights by relying upon the
federal Constitution.
III. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
In 1968 Congress, under its plenary authority over Indian tribes, en-
acted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).77 The ICRA responded to a
growing concern among legislators that tribal governments abused the
civil rights of American Indian citizens.78 Congress was specifically
concerned that Indians, as citizens of the United States, did not enjoy
the same constitutional rights as all other American citizens.7
The Act was intended to remedy the inequities caused by decisions
holding that, despite the tribal constitution's failure to protect Indians
from tribal abuses, federal courts would decline jurisdiction because
such abuses were internal controversies8 0 Felix Cohen, writing for the
Department of the Interior, described this dilemma in his Handbook of
Federal Indian Law:
[I]f an Indian desires protection in this respect, the members of an Indian
tribe must write the guarantees they desire into tribal constitutions. Such
guarantees have been written into many tribal constitutions that are now
in force. In absence of such provisions, an Indian reservation may be, in
some respects, a civil rights no-man's land where there is no relief against
tribal oppressions because of the failure of Congress to make federal civil
rights provisions. . . applicable.
8
'
76. Id. at 379.
77. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1302-1303 (1976)). See note 5 supra for text of statute.
78. See notes 82-91 infra and accompanying text.
79. See S. REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967), which reads in pertinent part:
The proposed Indian legislation, a result of the sub-committee's 6-year study, is an effort
on the part of those who believe in constitutional rights for all Americans to give "the
forgotten Americans" basic rights which all other Americans enjoy. These measures will
not cure all the ills suffered by the American Indians, but they will be important steps in
alleviating many inequities and injustices with which they are faced. These rights, fun-
damental to our system of constitutional freedoms, are not now secured by laws respect-
ing the American Indian.
80. For example, in Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370
F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967), the court refused on the basis of the internal controversy doctrine to
assume jurisdiction over a suit commenced by individual members of the tribe against the Tribal
Council to invalidate a tribal election.
81. U.S. SOLICITOR FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 126 (1958).
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Congressional hearings during the seven-year period before the
adoption of the ICRA inquired into the status of Indian rights. Testi-
mony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights re-
vealed that of 247 tribes organized under the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act, 117 had adopted constitutions protecting individ-
ual civil rights and 130 had not.12 The rights provided by these consti-
tutions, however, were found to be inadequate.83 One hundred eighty-
eight other tribes operated with no constitution at all.84 Although few
tribal courts allowed representation by attorneys, they sometimes per-
mitted representation by another member of the tribe.85 Tribes with
sufficient evidence-gathering resources generally protected the right to
remain silent. Smaller tribes with limited resources rarely offered this
protection. 6 Most tribes provided for jury trials, but insufficient com-
pensation discouraged potential jurors from serving. Generally, a
majority vote was sufficient to decide a verdict, thus eliminating the
necessity-and cost--of new trials because of hung juries.88  Some
tribes provided no right to jury trial-a denial that often resulted in
grossly unfair trials.89 Thus, despite the tribal desire to meet due pro-
cess requirements, financial restrictions often rendered this goal im-
probable.9°
The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights discovered nu-
merous violations of Indians' civil liberties by local authorities enfor-
cing state criminal laws in areas close to reservations. 9t Witnesses
testified to arrests of Indians for crimes for which whites would not be
82. 1961 Hearings, supra note 69, at 121.
83. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American lndians Before the Subcomm. on Consti-
tutional Rights ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 823 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearings].
84. 1961 Hearings, supra note 69, at 166.
85. Id. at 23.
86. 1963 Hearings, supra note 83, at 862.
87. Id.
88. 25 C.F.R. § l1.7(d) (1979).
89. 1961 Hearings, supra note 69, pt. 2, at 436.
90. Representative E. G. Berry informed Congress that the tribal judges had formed a group
whose purpose was "to upgrade the Tribal court system through professional advancement and
continuing education." 115 CONG. REC. 938 (1969).
91. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indians Before the Subcomn. on Consti-
tutional Rights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 769 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as 1962 Hearings]. See 1961 Hearings, supra note 69, at 224 (testimony of Ar-
thur Lazarus, Jr.).
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charged,92 as well as to arrests of Indians outside the state's jurisdic-
tion.93 While in custody, Indians were sometimes forced to perform
labor not required of non-Indian prisoners. 94 Deprivation of due pro-
cess in arraignment was common, and the right to counsel often was
not explained to Indian defendants or was refused upon request.95 Lo-
cal judges occasionally disallowed pleas of not guilty made by Indian
defendants.96 Indian witnesses charged that some state officials failed
to provide adequate resources to those law enforcement agencies with
jurisdiction to protect reservations.97
The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights was convinced,
after hearing several years of testimony concerning violations of Indi-
ans' civil liberties, that Congress should take extreme and effective ac-
tion. Congress decided to incorporate selectively the Bill of Rights into
the ICRA.98 Under the Act, Indians are guaranteed free exercise of
religion,99 freedom of speech,"° freedom of the press, t01 and freedom
to peaceably assemble and petition the government. 0 2 The Act pro-
tects against unreasonable search and seizures, 03 double jeopardy,"n
92. See Hearings on S-961-968 and SJ Res. 40 Before Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 331 (1965).
93. See 1963 Hearings, supra note 83, at 827; 1962 Hearings, supra note 91, at 639.
94. See 1962 Hearings, supra note 91, at 588. The discretionary treatment was evidenced by
the testimony of the Chairman of the Crow Creek Sioux, who quoted a Police Commissioner as
saying: "'Well, I think the boys are going to have to get some more Indians in jail, because we
need a lot of snow moved over there on the north side of town.'" 1963 Hearings, supra note 83, at
898.
95. See 1962 Hearings, supra note 91, at 598.
96. 1961 Hearings, supra note 69, pt. 2, at 375.
97. Id. at 406-12.
98. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1302-1303 (1976). The ICRA contains a habeas corpus provision that provides a remedy to
enforce the statute. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in
a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe." 25
U.S.C. § 1303 (1976). This remedy alone, however, has been found to be insufficient to effectuate
congressional intent. Thus, courts have fashioned other remedies when necessary. "[I]t is the duty
of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congres-
sional purpose." J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409,414 n.13 (1968); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210,
213 (1944). The district court of Arizona held proper an implied civil remedy under the statute.
Dodge v. Nakai, 293 F. Supp. 673 (D. Ariz. 1968).
99. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1976).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. § 1302 (2).
104. Id. § 1302 (3).
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and compelled self-incrimination,"°5 and contains equal protection and
due process clauses. ' 6 The Act differs from the Bill of Rights in that it
does not prohibit an establishment of religion; presumably, this was
excluded in deference to tribal cultural considerations. The Act guar-
antees the right to counsel only at the defendant's expense, 10 7 because
tribal governments normally would be incapable of sustaining this
financial burden. No right exists under the ICRA to indictment by a
grand jury of six members in cases involving the possibility of impris-
onment.10 8
Despite the similarities between the language of the ICRA and the
Bill of Rights, it is clear that the majority of Congress did not intend to
apply to tribal governments the same substantive standards the federal
courts apply to enforce the Constitution within state and federal gov-
ernments. 0 9 Although some senators disagreed with that conclu-
sion, I" the majority applied the constitutional language only in light of
tribal customs and traditions."'I After receiving many objections to the
ICRA from the Pueblo tribe because of the similarity of the Act's lan-
guage with that of the Constitution, Senator Sam J. Ervin responded:
I realize that the all Indian Pueblo Council of New Mexico has voiced
serious objections to the provisions of the proposed act which employs
language taken from the First and Fourth through Eighth amendments
and has asked to be exempt from that Title. In all sincerity, I do not
believe that [their fears] can be justified. The Pueblo Indians have a rich,
colorful form of government founded on tradition and wise experience.
In no conceivable way was it my intention, through the provisions of the
[ICRA] to hamper, weaken or destroy the Pueblo tribal traditions or any
Indian tribal governments in this Nation."12
105. Id. § 1302 (4).
106. Id. § 1302 (8).
107. Id. § 1302 (6).
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court recently summarized the differences
between the ICRA and the Constitution in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 n.14
(1978).
109. See generally, 1963 Hearings, supra note 83, pt. 4.
110. See, e.g.. S. REP. No. 841, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 6, 10-11, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1864:
Title II of the [Indian Civil Rights Act] would grant to the American Indians enumerated
constitutional rights and protection from arbitrary action in their relationship with tribal
governments, state governments, and the Federal government. Investigations have
shown that tribal members' basic constitutional rights have been denied at every level.
111. See generally 1963 Hearings, supra note 83.
112. Hearings on H.A 15419 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm on Indian Affairs of the
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Indians also challenged the Act as an infringement of tribal sover-
eignty because it does not allow for tribal consent to its application."t3
The National Tribal Chairman Association adopted a resolution in
1973 calling for an amendment to the Act.1 4 The resolution stated that
the ICRA violates the principle of self-government associated with In-
dian tribes because courts have construed the Act as granting federal
courts jurisdiction over issues such as the right to membership in a
tribe, the operation of tribal elections, the selection of tribal officials,
and the right to conduct tribal governmental business."' Indians also
objected to judicial interpretations of the ICRA that imposed federal
constitutional law on Indian governments." 16
The proposed amendment to section 130 1(1) 1 " would define "Indian
tribe" as "any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the juris-
diction of the United States and recognized as possessing powers of
self-government which has consented to the pro visions a/this subchapter
by an afirmative vote of the adult members of the tribe, band, or other
group of Indians in an election called by the Secretary of the Interiorfor
that purpose.""'  The Indians hoped to recover, through this resolu-
tion, the sovereignty and independence lost through the implementa-
tion of the ICRA. Congress, however, did not adopt the proposed
amendment.
IV. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE ICRA: PRO-INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY
Although the amendment proposed by the National Tribal Chair-
House Comm on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968) (statement of Sen.
Ervin).
113. See 1 INDIAN L. RPTR. 63-65 (1974). Some federal courts, however, have indicated that
there is nothing in the Act showing that Congress intended to sweep aside the doctrine of Indian
sovereignty. See, e.g., Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1236-37
(4th Cir. 1974); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 655-56 (10th Cir. 1974); Groundhog v. Keeler,
442 F.2d 674, 681-82 (10th Cir. 1971); Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619, 623 (D.N.D. 1973),
114. See 1 INDIAN L. RPTR. 63-65 (1974).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 64. This objection was based upon Indians' concern that the ICRA imposes legal
standards that conflict with the customs and laws of the tribes.
117. Id. Before introducing its amendment, the Association claimed that "such erosion of the
rights of the tribes, bands or other groups of Indians to self-government should not be imple-
mented into the laws controlling such tribes, bands or other groups of Indians without the consent
of the individual tribe, band or other group of Indians." Id.
118. Id. at 64-65 (proposed amendment italicized).
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man Association failed, subsequent federal court decisions indicate a
trend toward conscientious effectuation of Congress' intent to provide
Indians with civil rights protection but minimize infringement upon tri-
bal sovereignty."I9 In Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux
Tribe 2 ' the Eighth Circuit recognized that the ICRA should protect
the civil rights of individual Indians but not jeopardize tribal self-gov-
ernment and cultural identity.' The court held that the fourteenth
amendment standard developed by the judiciary '2 2 did not control the
interpretation of the equal protection clause of the ICRA.12 3 In re-
sponse to plaintiff's claim that the twenty-sixth amendment to the Con-
stitution 124 should be applicable to tribal elections, the court concluded
that the equal protection clause of the ICRA did not limit the power of
an Indian tribe to use twenty-one as the minimum voting age for tribal
elections. 1 25
119. See, e.g.. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th
Cir. 1975) (equal protection clause of ICRA is not coextensive with equal protection clause of
United States Constitution); Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971)
(ICIRA is concerned primarily with the administration of tribal justice, not with particular aspects
of tribal structure or officeholding); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D.) (meaning and
application of ICRA to tribes necessarily differs from established Anglo-American jurisprudential
meaning), remanded on other grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1974); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F.
Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973) (equal protection and due process clauses of ICRA prohibit tribal gov-
ernments from ignoring their own election rules), reP'don othergrounds, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir.
1974). See also Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp. 360 (D. Mont. 1977)
(tribal chairman's due process claims resulting from his impeachment by Crow Tribal Council
were not to be gauged against United States Constitution and procedure set forth therein for
impeachment, but should be measured against tribal custom and structure of government).
120. 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975).
121. Id. at 1082.
122. See note 6 supra.
123. 507 F.2d at 1083. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976), and Groundhog v.
Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971), indicate that the terminology used in the Indian Civil
Rights Act should be construed with due regard for historical, governmental, and cultural values
of Indian tribes; thus, the meaning of those terms under the ICRA need not agree with the mean-
ing of the same terms under the United States Constitution. Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700
(8th Cir. 1973), and White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973), however, indicate
that in some instances the equal protection clause of the ICRA should be interpreted in the same
manner as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (right to vote for 18-year-olds).
125. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir.
1975). But see White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973), in which the Eighth
Circuit relied on the familiar standards of the federal Constitution's equal protection clause in
determining the validity of tribal election procedures. The court held that the one-person-one-
vote principle, developed under the equal protection clause, is applicable to tribal elections of an
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In Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Driving Hawk12 6 the court held that each
Indian tribe has the duty to establish a system by which election con-
tests can be resolved in compliance with the guarantees of equal protec-
tion and due process in the ICRA. 127 Federal courts should not
supervise decisions made by tribes concerning issues that arise in tribal
elections. Indian tribes should make these decisions based on their
own substantive standards, not on those of the United States Constitu-
tion.128
Tom v. Sutton 129 again emphasized Indians' use of their own sub-
stantive standards. In addressing the issue of mandatory appointment
of counsel for tribal members in criminal proceedings before the tribal
court, 31 the Ninth Circuit held that the terms "due process" and
"equal protection" in the ICRA should be construed with regard for
historical, cultural, and governmental values of Indian tribes.' 3 ' The
court reasoned that the phrases should not automatically be accorded
Indian tribe that has established voting procedures precisely paralleling Anglo-American proce-
dures. Id. at 1314. 4ccord, Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1973).
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 established Indians' right to self-government over tribal
affairs, including tribal elections. This right, however, is restricted because the Act requires ap-
proval by the Secretary of Interior for many governmental acts. IRA § 6, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976)
provides:
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to
organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws,
which shall become effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of
the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such reservation, as the case may be, at a
special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules
and regulations as he may prescribe. Such constitution and bylaws, when ratified as
aforesaid and approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall be revocable by an election
open to the same voters and conducted in the same manner as hereinabove pro-
vided ...
Compare Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977) (secretarial elec-
tions held within tribe pursuant to regulations prescribed by Secretary of Interior are federal elec-
tions regulated by federal statute to which twenty-sixth amendment applies), with Wounded Head
v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975) (twenty-sixth amendment
held inapplicable to tribal elections), and Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1967) (IRA merely provided the authority and procedures
by which an Indian tribe may organize itself and adopt a tribal constitution and bylaws; jurisdic-
tion is not within its purview).
126. 534 F.2d 98 (10th Cir. 1976).
127. Id. at 100.
128. Id. (by implication).
129. 533 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1976).
130. Id. at 1102.
131. Id. at 1104-05; accord, Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971). But see Daly
v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973) (federal one-person-one-vote principle imposed on
Indian tribes); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973) (same).
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their meaning under the Constitution.'32 Although the due process
clause of the Constitution required appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants in criminal cases, the ICRA "specifically provides that a
person may have counsel [only] at his own expense."' 133 The court thus
concluded that the due process clause of the ICRA cannot be construed
to require appointed counsel for Indian offenders. 134
Similarly, in Janis v. Wilson ' 35 the South Dakota District Court held
that although Congress used language in the ICRA similar to that in
the Bill of Rights, the meaning and application of the Act to Indian
tribes may differ from the established Anglo-American interpretation
and application of the Bill of Rights to federal and state govern-
ments. 136 The court recognized Congress' concern that the ICRA not
be used as a vehicle to impose federal constitutional law upon Indi-
ans. 137
The Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez13 8 recently
reaffirmed the judicial trend toward application of the ICRA without
infringing upon tribal sovereignty. The decision will have substantial
impact on the use of the ICRA to resolve disputes arising between Indi-
ans and their tribal governments. Julia Martinez, a member of the
Santa Clara Pueblo tribe, challenged a 1939 tribal ordinance that
granted tribal membership to the children of male members who mar-
ried nonmembers but denied membership to the children of female
132. 533 F.2d at 1104.
133. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1976).
134. 533 F.2d at 1104; Vf. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976)
(tribes may structure their government in any manner that does not violate ICRA); McCurdy v.
Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974) (ICRA was not intended to encompass aspects of fifth, sixth,
seventh, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d
1140 (8th Cir. 1973) (Indian Bill of Rights was not meant to diminish tribal judicial authority);
Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971) (Constitution applies to Indian nations only if
it expressly binds them or is made binding upon them by treaty or act of Congress).
135. 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D.), remanded on other grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1974).
136. Id. at 1150.
137. By not including certain clauses of the Bill of Rights and by modifying the clauses
that were finally incorporated into [the ICRA], Congress recognized as legitimate the
tribal interest in maintaining traditional practices that conflict with constitutional con-
cepts of personal freedom developed in a different social context. The legislative history
of [the ICRA] indicates that the scope of the individual rights contained therein is to be
determined by balancing them against the legitimate interests of the tribe in maintaining
the traditional values of their unique governmental and cultural identity.
Id.
138. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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members who married outside the tribe. 3 9 The Court avoided decid-
ing whether the ordinance violated the equal protection provision of
the ICRA by focusing upon the jurisdictional issue.'4 ' The Tenth Cir-
cuit had accepted the district court's ruling that the substantive provi-
sions of the ICRA (Title I) impliedly authorize civil actions for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the tribe.' 4' The Supreme
Court reversed and held that the tribe's sovereign immunity barred
such suits' 42 because the ICRA does not grant federal courts plenary
jurisdiction to decide internal controversies affecting matters of tribal
self-government. 43
The Supreme Court reasoned that Indians should be free to resolve
their internal disputes.'" Subjecting tribal government actions to re-
view in federal courts could seriously undermine the Indian officials'
authority. 145  The Court recognized that one major objective of the
ICRA was to strengthen "the position of individual tribal members vis-
139. Id. at 51.
140. Id. at 58-72.
141. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1042 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49
(1978).
142. The Court ignored holdings of most lower federal courts that the ICRA constituted an
implied negation by Congress of tribal immunity from suit. See Crowe v. Eastern Band of Chero-
kee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974); Thompson v. Tonasket, 487 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 954 (1974); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973);
Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973); Daly v. United States,
483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973); Luxon v.
Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal
Council, 387 F. Supp. 1194 (D.S.D. 1975); White v. Tribal Council, 383 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn.
1974); Means v. Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 378 (D.S.D. 1974); Hickey v. Crow Creek Hous. Auth., 379
F. Supp. 1002 (D.S.D. 1974); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973), re;"don other
grounds, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Seneca Constitutional Rights Org. v. George, 348 F. Supp.
48 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971); Loncassion v. Leekity,
334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971); Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont.
1969); cf. Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438 (D.S.D. 1974) (court lacked juris-
diction in absence of allegation that tribal membership provisions were not uniformly applied;
equal protection requirements of fourteenth amendment should not be embraced by equal protec-
tion guarantees of ICRA); Lefthand v. Crow Tribal Council, 329 F. Supp. 728 (D. Mont. 1971)
(complaint did not state a claim for relief where it alleged that tribal government irregularities
deprived plaintiff of equal protection and due process under Indian Bill of Rights, but did not
allege that plaintiff suffered arbitrary and intentional discrimination distinct from other tribal
members). But see Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Wyo. 1970), af'd
sub nom. Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
143. 436 U.S. at 59.
144. Id. at 59-60.
145. Id.
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d-vis the tribe."'46 The Court, however, found this interest to be out-
weighed by the competing objective of furthering tribal self-govern-
ment.147 In addition, by providing habeas corpus as the sole means for
federal court review, Congress attempted to balance these competing
interests.'45 The Supreme Court suggested that its holding would in-
sure that the ICRA be interpreted and applied on the basis of tribal
customs and traditions as mandated by Congress. 149
The Martinez decision represents a significant victory for tribal lead-
ers, tribal court judges, and other supporters of Indian self-government.
Tribal courts and councils are much better equipped to resolve internal
disputes than are federal courts. 50 Tribal court systems are no longer
incapable of adequately enforcing the substantive guarantees of the
ICRA.' 5 t
Although supporters of Indian self-government may be encouraged
by the manner in which courts have construed the ICRA, 152 concern
remains over whether constitutional provisions beyond those in the
146. Id. at 62.
147. Id. at 62-66. The Court stated:
Creation of a federal cause of action for the enforcement of rights created in Title I,
however useful it might be in securing compliance with § 1302, plainly would be at odds
with the congressional goal of protecting tribal self-government. Not only would it un-
dermine the authority of tribal forums. . . , but it would also impose serious financial
burdens on already "financially disadvantaged" tribes.
1d. at 64.
148. Id. at 66-67.
149. By not exposing tribal officials to the full array of federal remedies available to re-
dress actions of federal and state officials, Congress may. . . have considered that reso-
lution of statutory issues under [the ICRA], and particularly those issues likely to arise in
a civil context, will frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom 'which
tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than federal courts.
Id. at 71.
150. Id. at 66. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
151. See Hall, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, An Analsis, 5 INDIAN L. REP. M-34, M-36
1978):
The increasing sophistication of tribal judges, the greater presence of Indian lawyers
working in reservation communities, the imaginative use of Indian trial advocates and
paralegals in tribal courts are all indications of a commitment by the tribes to an upgrad-
ing of their judiciaries. Vartinez makes it even more important that this progress con-
tinue.
152. The judicial trend toward respect for tribal self-government may have been triggered by a
general change in federal policy occurring throughout the 1970's. See generally Goldberg, Public
Law 2A'0." The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535
1975); Werhan, The Sovereigno , of Indian Tribes: A Reaffrmation and Strengthening in the 1970s,
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1978). In 1975 Congress created the American Indian Policy Review
Commission whose duty was to make a comprehensive investigation and study of Indian affairs.
The purpose of the Commission was to develop, on the basis of Indian input, recommendations
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ICRA should be imposed upon tribal governments. There is strong ju-
dicial support for the proposition that the ICRA has not incorporated
all individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States. 15 3 Despite this precedent, one recent circuit court decision held
that the twenty-sixth amendment, which lowers the voting age from
twenty-one to eighteen, should be imposed upon tribal governments.
54
V. CONCLUSION
The ICRA has had both a beneficial and a detrimental impact upon
the American Indian. The Act has provided individual Indians with
fundamental civil liberties they formerly lacked in their relationships
with tribal, state, and federal governments.155 Because Congress en-
acted and imposed the ICRA on Indians without their consent, how-
ever, the Act has resulted in infringement on tribal sovereignty and on
the right to self-government.156 The infringement on tribal sovereignty
has been mitigated by recent judicial decisions that use tribal customs
and traditions as the basis for interpreting the ICRA. 5 7 The Martinez
decision, in particular, places the primary power to enforce the Act in
the tribal courts rather than in the federal courts.'" Unless this deci-
sion is undermined by Congress, the Supreme Court has successfully
struck a balance between the competing policies of the ICRA-provi-
sion of civil rights protections for Indians and reduction of infringe-
ment on tribal sovereignty.
Judy D. Lynch
for future congressional policy. See Kicgingbird, The American Indian Policy Review Commission:
A Prospectfor Future Change in Federal Indian Policy, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 243 (1975).
153. See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973) (fourteenth amendment);
O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973) (fifth amendment); White
Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973) (fourteenth amendment); Groundhog v.
Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971) (fifth and fifteenth amendments); Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F.
Supp. 619 (D.N.D. 1973) (fifth, seventh, and fourteenth amendments); Seneca Constitutional
Rights Org. v. George, 348 F. Supp. 51 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (fifth amendment); Spotted Eagle v.
Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969) (fourteenth amendment).
154. Cheyennee River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d 1085 (8th Cir. 1977). But see Motah v.
United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967).
155. See notes 78-81 supra and accompanying text.
156. See notes 113-18 supra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 119-38 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 138-51 supra and accompanying text.
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